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The prevailing conceptualizations of the impression 
formation process were discussed in terms of their ability 
to account for a number of judgmental shifts. The paper 
suggested that these conceptualizations were incomplete 
regarding their accounts of assimilation and contrast effects. 
This incompletion is particularly evident in those cases in 
which shifts in judgment result from nonsemantic manipulations 
(e.g., responding technique). A theoretical analysis was 
proposed which takes into consideration the perseveration/ 
termination of an initial evaluative response, and a per-
ceiver's feature weighting strategies. Two experiments were 
conducted to test some of the implications of this view. The 
results of both studies supported the proposed analysis. 
Specifically, in both studies, impressions of a target shifted 
toward a prime under conditions in which the primed response 
was likely to have perseverated, whereas impressions of a 
target shifted away from the prime under conditions in which 
the primed response was likely to have been terminated. Fur­
ther, this pattern of results was observed when the primed 
response was a broad affective response (Experiment 1) and 
when it was a more specific descriptive response (Experiment 
2). Implications of these results were discussed in terms of 
a number of social cognition issues. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the context of interpersonal interaction, it is 
possible to characterize human beings as complex sources of 
information. When interacting with one another, people in­
tentionally, as well as unintentionally, emit cues which 
other people can use as a basis for generating inferences 
and forming impressions about them. As a rule, the informa­
tion that one receives about another person is complex, 
mutable, and multidimensional. Often, it is contradictory. 
One of the more enduring lines of investigation in social 
psychology has been concerned with understanding the processes 
whereby people mold such diverse information into a single, 
unified impression. 
The linear approach 
The most influential approach to this issue in recent 
years has been Anderson's information integration theory 
(e.g., Anderson, 1974). The goal of this approach to im­
pression formation is the formulation of an algebraic model 
which describes the relation between stimulus input charac­
teristics and reported judgments. According to information 
integration theory, a stimulus is characterized by two 
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parameters: scale value and weight. The scale value of a 
stimulus represents the perceiver's subjective response to 
the information on the dimension of judgment (e.g., good-bad, 
light-heavy, like-dislike). The weight of a stimulus is its 
importance or relevance to the judgment. It is perhaps best 
conceptualized as the proportion that each element of a 
compound stimulus contributes to the overall evaluation of 
the compound. Anderson assumes that a stimulus' scale valine 
is invariant across contexts, and that changes in evaluation 
result from changes in a stimulus' relative weight across 
contexts. 
According to information integration theory, impression 
formation is a two-component process. One component, valu­
ation, involves the determination of the various weights and 
scale values assigned to the information. The second com­
ponent, integration, involves the manner in which these 
weights and scale values are combined to arrive at a subjec­
tive judgment. The research derived from an information 
integration perspective has been concerned exclusively with 
the latter component. 
This research (e.g., Anderson, 1965) has suggested 
that evaluations in a social domain are consistent with a 
weighted averaging model of integration. This model can be 
described algebraically as follows: 
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Z w.s. 
i«0 
S w_. 
i=0 1 
That is, any judgment, J, is a weighted (w^) average of the 
scale (s^) value of the single components. Since the weight 
of the stimuli judged in any context is assumed to be rela­
tive, the weighting coefficients are constrained to sum to 
one. This means that the denominator in the previous equa­
tion, which represents the sum of the weighting coefficients, 
can be disregarded. This leads to the following simplifica­
tion of the averaging model: 
j = 1 wisi 
i=0 
Anderson's model includes a scale value for initial 
impression, iQ, which is the impression before any informa­
tion is obtained. This initial value is typically assumed 
to be zero (i.e., neutral), but may take on different values 
to reflect predispositions, motivational states, or other 
inner states of the evaluator (see Kaplan, 1970; 1971). 
Problems with the linear approach 
Although Anderson's approach to impression formation 
has a certain intuitive appeal, and is consistent with an 
abundance of data (see Anderson, 1974), there are a number 
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of problems associated with it. For one, it is not clear 
whether the model's empirical success indicates whether the 
model provides a valid description of the impression forma­
tion process or whether the model's accuracy is peculiar to 
the ideosyncratic judgmental situations constructed to test 
its validity (Wyer & Carlston, 1979). The model, in its 
general form, makes no testable predictions (Ajzen, 1977). 
It provides no a priori basis for predicting which integra­
tion rule or weighting assumption is correct for any partic­
ular response domain (Ostrom & Davis, 1979). In actual 
practice, the scale value and weighting coefficients are 
estimated on the basis of the obtained data (Anderson, 1970), 
and these estimates can be made only by assuming that scale 
value is invariant across contexts -(Anderson, 1974). This 
assumption, however, can be questioned on both logical and 
empirical grounds (Ostrom & Davis, 1979). 
Finally, Anderson's model has been criticized for its 
failure to deal adequately with process (e.g., Hamilton, 
Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978; 
Simon, 1976; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). Algebraic models 
depict rules which account for various input-output functions, 
but are indifferent with respect to the psychological pro­
cesses which underlie those functions (Anderson, 1974). An 
understanding of the psychological mediators of impression 
formation might aid in predicting the conditions under which 
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various integration rules or weighting rules are called into 
play. It may also aid in explaining why it is that a 
weighted average model seems to account so well for so many 
judgments. 
The social cognition approach 
Within the last five or so years, a new approach to the 
study of impression formation has begun to develop. It has 
been termed the social cognition approach, and is concerned 
with uncovering the processes whereby the stimulus configura­
tion and the perceiver's knowledge base interact to determine 
impressions. Within this approach, people are characterized 
as active processors whose social knowledge, in the form of 
schemas, prototypes, or categories affect his or her encoding, 
storage, and retrieval of social information (Cohen, 1981). 
Although a general theory has yet to be formulated in this 
area, there is a growing consensus on a number of general 
points (Srull & Wyer, 1980). 
First, it is generally assumed, following Bruner (1957), 
that person perception can be conceptualized as a categoriza­
tion process. That is, a person who receives information 
about a target person and wishes to form an impression of 
the person may first interpret, or encode, this information 
in terms of some class of things or events in the person's 
experience (Higgins & King, 1980; Wyer & Srull, 1980). In 
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Bruner's words, "All perception is generic in the sense that 
whatever Is perceived Is placed In and receives Its meaning 
from a class of percepts with which it is grouped" (p. 124). 
Assignment of an observation to any given category is assumed 
to depend, in part, on the degree of match between the fea­
tures observed in the stimulus and those in the category, 
although the precise nature of this matching process is still 
a matter of debate (e.g., Smith & Medin, 1981). 
A category can be broadly defined as a set of specifi­
cations about what events will be grouped as equivalent 
(Bruner, 1957). It is assumed to contain information about 
the essential and characteristic attributes of category mem­
bers, the range of category attributes, and typical or pro­
totypical exemplars of the category (Higgins & King, 1980). 
Once a stimulus has been encoded as an instance of a par­
ticular category, many of the features associated with the 
category may be attributed to the stimulus, and it is this 
elaborated-upon impression, rather than the original stimu­
lus information, that is used by the perceiver to make 
further judgments and inferences about the stimulus (Carlston, 
1977; Lingle, Geva, Ostrom, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1979; 
Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). 
It should be evident that within the social cognition 
approach, one's knowledge base is more than a depository of 
experience; it serves important processing functions. Cohen 
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and Ebbesen (1979) listed three roles that a perceiver's 
knowledge base plays in impression formation: 1) it deter­
mines the features which will be attended to, 2) it deter­
mines the interpretation of any given stimulus, and 3) it 
affects memory by determining what aspects of the situation 
are stored and which aspects are elaborated upon. 
Category accessibility 
A distinction can be made between category availability 
and category accessibility (Higgins & King, 1980). Avail­
ability refers to whether or not a category exists in the 
perceiver. Accessibility refers to the readiness with 
which a stored category is retrieved from memory and/or is 
utilized in stimulus encoding. Obviously, if a category is 
unavailable to a perceiver, a stimulus could not be inter­
preted in terms of that category. On the other hand, two 
or more categories may be equally available to a perceiver 
but not be equally accessible. The greater the accessibility 
of a category, the less the input necessary for categoriza­
tion to occur in terms of this category, the wider the range 
of input characteristics that will be accepted as fitting 
the category in question, and the more likely that categories 
that provide a better or equally good fit for the input will 
be masked (Bruner, 1957). One implication of this is that 
judgments of a person may be affected substantially by 
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rather fortuitous events that lead one or another category 
to be more accessible to the judge at the time the informa­
tion is initially received (Wyer & Srull, 1980). 
Category accessibility and impressions 
One of the first demonstrations of the effect of 
category accessibility on impressions was conducted by 
Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977). These investigators 
primed certain categories in subjects by exposing them to 
trait words associated with the categories. This was done 
in a task prior to, and ostensibly unrelated to, an impres­
sion formation task. The priming words were either positive 
or negative and were either applicable or nonappllcable to 
the subsequent impression formation task. In the latter 
task, all subjects were given the same behavioral description 
of a stimulus person, and asked to give their impression of 
the person. The description contained passages which had 
been pre-rated to have approximately a fifty percent prob­
ability of being interpreted as positive or as negative. 
The sentence "Donald was thinking of crossing the Atlantic 
in a sailboat", for example, could be construed as either 
adventuresome or reckless. Kiggins et al. hypothesized 
that which particular encoding would occur would depend 
upon whether the adventurous or the reckless category had 
been primed in the prior task. 
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Consistent with this hypothesis, Higgins et al. found 
that subjects in the positive-relevant condition formed 
more.positive impressions of the stimulus person than did 
the subjects in the negative-relevant conditions. Prior 
exposure to positive-irrelevant or negative-irrelevant trait 
terms had no significant effect on the impressions. This 
pattern of results suggests that the priming task did not 
have a direct effect on the judgment of the target, but 
influenced these judgments only indirectly through its 
mediating effect on how the target's behavior was initially 
encoded. The same objective stimulus was interpreted dif­
ferently depending upon which categories had been primed, 
and upon whether these categories were or were not applicable 
to the impression. 
These results were replicated and extended by Srull 
and Wyer (1979; 1980) who demonstrated that categories can 
be primed by exposing subjects to behavioral exemplars of 
the category. They also demonstrated that differences in 
impressions due to category accessibility are greater one 
week after the initial encoding than one day after the 
initial encoding, supporting a "schema-plus-correction" view 
(Bartlett, 1932) of categorization in impression formation. 
In addition, trait categories activated at retrieval had no 
effect on impressions. 
10 
Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) provided evidence that 
category accessibility can influence impressions even when 
the priming words are presented beyond the subject's 
awareness. This study supports the view that category 
priming effects do not require a conscious expectancy or 
set on the part of the perceiver, and that such effects are 
not artifacts of experimental demand characteristics. 
Higgins and Chaires (1980) have shown that category 
accessibility can have behavioral as well as verbal effects. 
Subjects were shown slides and told that they would later 
have to recall the items in the slides. Five of the slides 
depicted single objects (e.g., comb, eyeglasses), whereas 
ten of the slides depicted objects designated by a phrase 
(e.g., bowl containing cereal, carton containing eggs). For 
half of the subjects, the experimenter described the phrase 
slides with "of" (e.g., a carton of eggs). For the remain­
ing subjects, the experimenter described the phrase slides 
with "and" (e.g., carton and eggs). Subsequent to this 
priming task, all subjects were asked to solve Duncker's 
(1945) candle problem. In this problem, subjects are given 
a cardboard wall, a candle, a full box of matches, and a 
box filled with thumb tacks. They are told that their task 
is to affix the candle to the cardboard wall so that the 
candle burns properly and does not drip wax on the table. 
The solution to the problem involves using the tack box as 
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a platform affixed to the cardboard wall. Finding the cor­
rect solution depends upon the ability to see the tacks and 
the tack box as separate elements. 
Higgins and Chaires hypothesized that priming subjects 
with "and" slides would increase the probability that sub­
jects would perceive the tacks and the box as separate 
elements, whereas priming subjects with "of" slides would 
decrease the probability that they would perceive the tacks 
and the box as separate elements. As a result, subjects in 
the "and" condition should be more likely than those in the 
"of" condition to solve the candle problem in the allotted 
time. The results were consistent with this hypothesis. 
Higgins and Chaires concluded that the increased accessibil­
ity of the interrelational constructs affected the encoding 
of the objects, and that this, in turn, influenced their use 
in solving the problem. 
A category accessibility view can also be used to 
interpret certain order effects in impression formation. 
If the initial information in a sequence accesses a cate­
gory, then the subsequent information in the sequence should 
be encoded in terms of the category. The result would be 
primacy effects. That is, the initial information in the 
sequence would have a greater impact on the final evaluation 
than would the later information. Evidence of primacy 
effects in impression formation is abundant (e.g., Anderson 
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& Hubert, 1963; Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Anderson, 1965; 
Asch, 1946). One example is the study by Jaccard and 
Fishbein (1975). They asked subjects to indicate their 
liking for a stimulus person after reading a description of 
the person. For all subjects, the stimulus person was de­
scribed with the same traits (e.g., loving, sincere, quiet, 
ugly, stout, critical). For some subjects, however, the 
traits were ordered from positive to negative; whereas, for 
the other subjects, the traits were ordered from negative 
to positive. Consistent with the notion that the later 
information in a sequence is interpreted in terms of the 
categories accessed by the initial information, subjects 
receiving the positive-to-negative sequence rated the 
stimulus person as significantly more likeable than did 
subjects receiving the negative-to-positive sequence. 
In sum, the category accessibility view provides an 
interpretation of a number of context and order effects in 
impression formation. According to this view, the context 
within which a stimulus is embedded, or which immediately 
precedes it, activates a set of cognitions (i.e., associa­
tions to events in the organism's experience) which, in 
turn, make certain interpretations of the incoming informa­
tion more probable. The interpretations which are most 
probable are those which are connotatively and/or affec­
tively consistent with the primed category. 
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Affect and impressions 
Results like those discussed above have also been 
found when the affective state of the perceiver is manipu­
lated (see Clore & Byrne, 1974). Griffitt and Veitch (1975), 
for example, found that subjects formed more positive im­
pressions of others while in comfortable surroundings than 
when in hot and crowded surroundings. 
Although such results have typically been interpreted 
in terms of conditioned emotional states (Byrne & Clore, 
1970), they are also interpretable in terms of category 
accessibility (Wyer, 1974). This argument can be made on 
the basis that affective states influence the accessibility 
of events in memory. Work on mood and memory (e.g., Bower, 
1981; Hale & Strickland, 1976; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & 
Karp, 1978) has demonstrated that people in positive moods 
can recall more positive than negative events, and can re­
call positive events more quickly than negative events. 
People in negative moods can recall more negative than 
positive events, and can recall negative events more quickly 
than positive events. In other words, it appears that one's 
affective state is highly correlated with one's accessible 
categories. 
Whether affective states have an effect on evaluation 
which is independent of the effects of category accessibil­
ity (Zajonc, 1980) is unclear at this time. For our present 
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purposes, only two points need to be made: 1) social 
judgments are multidimensional, and cannot be characterized 
by a single positive-negative dimension (Bleda, Bell, & 
Byrne, 1973), 2) both the category accessibility view and 
the conditioned affect view predict a positive correlation 
between the valence of a context and the valence of impres­
sions made in that context. 
Contrast effects 
Although a large literature exists which supports 
assimilation or positive context effects, an equally large 
literature supports the prediction that impressions of a 
target person can be shifted away from the context within 
which the stimulus is evaluated. In a study by Simpson and 
Ostrom (1976), subjects were given descriptions of two tar­
get persons and asked to infer additional traits that each 
person might possess. Half of the subjects read a positive 
description of the initial target person; whereas, half read 
a negative initial description. Following this, both groups 
of subjects read about and evaluated a neutral person. 
Simpson and Ostrom found that the impressions of the neutral 
person were negative following the positive stranger, but 
were positive following the negative stranger. 
Kenrick and Johnson (1979) induced a negative affective 
state in some of their subjects by exposing them to loud 
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bursts of noise. Within this negative context, the subjects 
were asked to evaluate two strangers. Evaluations of both 
strangers were based on the subjects' readings of attitu-
dinal statements attributed to the strangers. The subjects 
were told that one set of statements belonged to a partici­
pant in the experiment, whereas the other set belonged to 
a physically absent stranger. Kenrick and Johnson found 
that impressions of the stranger described as a participant 
in the experiment were more positive when rated by subjects 
in the negative context than when rated by subjects in the 
neutral context. Conversely, impressions of the physically 
absent stranger were less positive when given by subjects 
in the negative context than when given by subjects in the 
neutral context. In other words, both a positive and a 
negative context effect was found using the same kind of 
stimuli in the same context. 
Another example comes from the Higgins, Rholes, and 
Jones (1977) study cited earlier as support for the cate­
gory accessibility view. Higgins et al. found that impres­
sions of a stimulus person were evaluatively consistent with 
the traits in the priming task provided the traits were 
applicable to the description on which the impression was 
based. In the case where the priming traits were not 
applicable to the subsequent description, the impressions 
were shifted away from the priming context. That is, 
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impressions were more positive following a negative context 
than following a positive context. Although this effect 
did not reach a traditionally accepted level of statistical 
significance, it did indicate a strong trend toward contrast 
in the non-applicable trait condition. 
Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, and Lynn (1978) had subjects 
judge the importance of a target issue in the context of 
either important or unimportant issues. They found that the 
target was rated as significantly less important when im­
bedded in the context of important issues than when imbedded 
in the context of unimportant issues. In a different set­
ting, one week subsequent to this rating, a confederate of 
the experimenter asked subjects for help in a project related 
to the target issue. Subjects who had rated the issue in 
the unimportant context offered significantly more help 
than did subjects who had rated the issue in the context of 
important issues. These results indicate both that contrast 
effects in ratings can persist over time, and that contrast 
effects can serve as a basis for subsequent behavior and 
attitudes. 
Negative context effects have also been found when 
subjects rated others in the context of aversive odors 
(Rotton, Barry, Frey, & Soler, 1978), when agreeable 
strangers were rated in the context of disagreeable 
strangers, and vice-versa (Griffitt, 1971; Mascaro & Graves, 
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1973), and when average-looking faces were evaluated in the 
context of attractive faces (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980). 
In terms of order effects, the category accessibility 
perspective has difficulty in accounting for the findings 
that the later information in a sequence has a larger im­
pact on the final impression of that sequence than does the 
early information. Within the gain-loss paradigm (Aronson 
& Linder, 1965), however, subjects have been found to eval­
uate a person associated with a negative-to-positive 
sequence of behaviors as more attractive than a person 
associated with an invariantly positive sequence (e.g., 
Clore, Wiggins, & Itkin, 1975; Mettee, Taylor, & Friedman, 
1973). If the later information in the sequence had been 
interpreted in terms of a category primed by the initial 
information, then an opposite pattern of results would be 
expected. 
Recency effects have also been observed when subjects 
are asked to pronounce each trait in a sequence aloud 
(Hendrick & Costantini, 1970), when subjects are asked to 
form impressions throughout the sequence (Stewart, 1965), 
and when subjects are forewarned that they will have to 
recall the stimuli in the sequence (Anderson & Hubert, 
1963). 
In short, it appears that neither positive or negative 
context effects is the rule, nor is primacy or recency the 
18 
rule. It appears, instead, that each effect is more or less 
probable under various conditions (cf., Jones & Goethals, 
1971). One important question that follows from this con­
clusion is whether there exists a way in which all of these 
effects can be understood within a single theoretical frame­
work. 
The feature overlap analysis 
Following in the tradition of the early social judgment 
work (e.g., Sherif & Hovland, 1961), Herr, Sherman, and 
Fazio (1983) suggested that assimilation and contrast to an 
accessed category might be understood in terms of the degree 
of similarity between the category and the target stimulus. 
According to their proposal, assimilation of a target to a 
prime will occur when the target and the prime possess a 
sufficient amount of features in common; whereas, contrast 
will occur when the target and the prime possess a less than 
sufficient amount of features in common. Although it is 
unclear what degree of feature overlap is to be considered 
a "sufficient" amount, this analysis can be tested by ask­
ing subjects to judge a number of stimuli that vary in their 
degree of similarity to the primed category. 
Herr et al. tested this analysis by priming subjects 
with different characteristics of animals, and asking them 
to judge various animals in terms of these characteristics. 
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The primes varied in their degree of extremity (e.g., very 
tame to very ferocious), and the animals varied in the de­
gree to which they possessed the various characteristics 
(e.g., rabbit, dog, lion). When the target was ambiguous 
with respect to the prime, and the prime was moderately 
extreme, assimilation occurred. When the target was unam­
biguous, or when the prime was extreme, contrast occurred. 
Herr et al. concluded that an accesses category acts 
as a standard to which the subject compares the stimulus 
input. If the comparison indicates that the stimulus and 
the category are similar, then assimilation occurs. If the 
comparison indicates that the stimulus and the category are 
dissimilar to one another, then contrast occurs. 
The case for stimulus coherence 
Although the above analysis provides a reasonable 
account of the results of a number of studies, there is rea­
son to believe that such discrepancy models are incomplete. 
For one thing, shifts in judgment have been obtained when 
the degree of feature overlap between stimuli has been held 
constant (e.g., Byrne, Lamberth, Palmer, & London, 1969; 
Luchins, 1958; Manis, 1967; Martin & Seta, 1983; Sigall & 
Landy, 1973). 
Martin and Seta (1983), for example, found that assim­
ilation or contrast could be produced by manipulating only 
the technique by which stimuli were evaluated. In this 
20 
study, subjects were asked to indicate their liking for two 
strangers, based upon a reading of attitudinal statements 
attributed to the strangers. Half of the subjects read 
about both strangers, and then evaluated each (final re­
sponding) . The other half read about and rated the first 
stranger, and then read about and rated the second stranger 
(interpolated responding). In both of these conditions, the 
first stranger agreed with the subject's attitudes at a 507. 
rate, whereas the second stranger agreed at a 100% rate. 
Martin and Seta found less of a difference between the 
perceived attractiveness of the two strangers when they were 
rated as a unit (final responding) than when they were rated 
as distinct from one another (interpolated responding). In 
addition, the 100% stranger in the final responding condition 
was rated as significantly less attractive than the control 
stranger, whereas the 100% stranger in the interpolated 
responding condition was rated as significantly more attrac­
tive than the control stranger. In short, when the 507q and 
the 1007» strangers were evaluated as a unit (i.e., final 
responding condition), assimilation occurred. When they were 
rated as distinct from one another (i.e., interpolated 
responding condition), contrast occurred. 
Since the same stimuli were used across the final and 
the interpolated responding conditions, the shifts in 
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judgment obtained in this study cannot be attributed to 
differing degrees of feature overlap across conditions 
(Herr et al., 1983) or to the accessing of different cate­
gories across conditions (Higgins et al., 1977). The 
results suggest, instead, that there was a differential use 
of the same information across conditions. Conceptually 
similar results have been obtained by others (Byrne et al., 
1969; Luchins, 1958; Stewart, 1965). 
Each of these studies has demonstrated that shifts in 
judgment can occur even when the degree of feature overlap 
between stimuli is held constant. In addition, these studies 
demonstrated that the relationship between the stimuli can be 
an important determinant of evaluation. The pattern of data 
generated by these studies suggests that evaluations of 
stimuli presented as a unit tend to exhibit assimilation, 
whereas evaluations of stimuli presented as distinct from one 
another tend to exhibit contrast (Martin & Seta, 1983; Seta, 
Martin, & Capehart, 1979; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Taylor, 
Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1979). 
Task completion and task interruption 
One reason that the relationship between stimuli could 
affect judgments is that a perceiver faces different task 
demands when evaluating unitized, as compared to distinct, 
stimuli. When stimuli are evaluated as a unit, evaluation 
of the unit is not complete until each element in the unit 
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has been considered. Therefore, in order to complete an 
evaluation of the unit, the individual's evaluative response 
to the initial stimuli must be maintained while the indiv­
idual evaluates the remaining stimuli. Because of its con­
tinued activation, the initial evaluative response may get 
integrated into the individual's evaluation of the remaining 
stimuli. The result would be assimilation of the later in­
formation toward the context of the earlier information. 
When stimuli are evaluated as distinct from one another, 
each evaluation completes a task. Therefore, the individual's 
evaluative response to the initial stimuli is not likely to 
remain active when the individual evaluates the remaining 
stimuli (cf., Lewin, 1951; Mandler, 1975, 1980; Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). It might still be accessible, 
however (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1980). Under 
such circumstances, the individual may attempt to differen­
tiate the incoming stimuli from the previous stimuli (Bjork, 
1972; Bjork & Geiselman, 1978; Block, 1971; Shebliske, 
Wilder, & Epstein, 1972) by weighting the features of the 
input that are distinct from the previous stimuli (Tversky, 
1977). Hence, contrast would occur. 
In short, it may be that when stimuli are evaluated as 
a unit, the perceiver searches for features in the incoming 
stimuli that confirm membership in the initially accessed 
category. When stimuli are evaluated as distinct from one 
another, the perceiver searches for features in the incoming 
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information that allow him or her to categorize this informa­
tion separately from the initial information. Then, to the 
extent that the searched-for features are found, assimilation 
should occur when stimuli are rated as a unit, and contrast 
should occur when stimuli are rated as distinct from one 
another. 
If this analysis is valid, then it should be possible 
to produce either assimilation or contrast of the same 
stimulus to the same accessed category by altering only the 
completion/incompletion of the perceiver's initial evalua­
tive response. The following study was designed to test 
this hypothesis. 
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Chapter II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Introduction 
Experiment One is based upon the assumption that the 
perseveration/termination of one evaluative response during 
the formation of another is an essential ingredient in judg­
mental shifts. Therefore, an attempt was made in this 
experiment to manipulate only the perseveration/termination 
of an initial response while holding all other stimulus 
characteristics constant. It may be possible to accomplish 
this by using procedures refined in work on the effects of 
task interruption (for summaries see Butterfield, 1964; 
Deutsch, 1954; Weiner, 1966). 
In the initial study concerned with task interruption, 
Zeigarnik (1927) asked subjects to engage in a series of 
rather simple tasks, such as enumerating cities, solving a 
riddle, and stringing beads. The subjects were allowed to 
complete some of these tasks, but were not allowed to com­
plete others. When subjects were asked, at the end of the 
experiment, to recall the tasks they had done, they recalled 
approximately twice as many interrupted as completed tasks. 
In addition, interrupted tasks were recalled first more 
than three times as frequently as the completed ones, and 
also appeared more often in the next highest position. This 
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pattern of results has come to be known as the "Zeigarnik 
effect". 
Marrow (1938) demonstrated that the recall differences 
could be accentuated by increasing the subject's involvement 
with the tasks. Marrow closely followed Zeigarnik's pro­
cedure, but introduced a set of instructions to heighten the 
subject's competetive interests. Subjects were told that 
their performance was to be compared with that of other 
students. Under these high motivation conditions, the ad­
vantage in recall for interrupted tasks over completed tasks 
was even greater than that found by Zeigarnik. Marrow found 
that for a number of subjects, the ratio went as high as 
four-to-one. 
Osviankina (1928) demonstrated that response persever­
ation as a result of task interruption extends to motor 
behavior as well as to memory. Osviankina essentially rep­
licated Zeigarnik's study, but, unlike Zeigarnik, allowed 
the subjects access to the task materials at what was, 
ostensibly, the end of the experiment. So, while the ex­
perimenter seemed to be involved in other matters, the sub­
jects were free to engage in any of the tasks that they had 
previously performed. Osviankina noted that subjects were 
significantly more likely to engage in previously interrupted 
tasks than to engage in previously completed tasks. 
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This work demonstrated that a response is more likely 
to perseverate when the task initiating the response has 
been interrupted than when the task has been completed. Of 
course, the Zeigarnik effect, like any effect, has parameters 
limiting its occurrence (see Butterfield, 1964). When the 
appropriate conditions are satisfied, however, the Zeigar­
nik effect is a powerful, replicable phenomenon. 
In Experiment One, subjects were given either a posi­
tive or a negative priming task, and then asked to form an 
impression of a person based upon their reading of an 
ambivalent description. Half of the subjects performed the 
impression task believing that the initial positive or 
negative priming task was completed. The other half per­
formed the impression task after having been interrupted be­
fore they could complete the priming task. 
It was hypothesized that the incompleted-task condition 
would be analogous to an evaluation of unitized stimuli in 
which the initial impression must be maintained, whereas 
the completed-task condition would be analogous to an eval­
uation of distinct stimuli in which each evaluation com-, 
pletes a task. It was predicted, therefore, that there 
would be a positive relationship between the valence of the 
initial priming task and the valence of the impression in 
the incompleted-task condition (i.e., assimilation), 
whereas there should be a negative relationship between 
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the valence of the prime and the valence of the impression 
in the completed-prime condition (i.e., contrast). 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty-four subjects were obtained from three separate 
psychology classes at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. An approximately equal number of students were 
drawn from each class for each of the four experimental 
conditions. There was a total of eleven subjects in each 
experimental condition. All subjects volunteered their 
participation. 
Design 
A positive and a negative priming task were crossed 
with the completion and the incompletion of the priming task 
to yield four between-group conditions: positive-complete, 
positive-incomplete, negative-complete, and negative-
incomplete. 
Stimulus materials 
The stimulus materials were presented to the subjects 
in two packets. The stimuli for the priming task consisted 
of a small booklet containing either positive or negative 
statements (e.g., Most mornings I wake up refreshed and 
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energetic versus Most mornings I just can't, seem to get 
started). These sentences were adapted from those used by 
Velten (1968) to induce affective states in laboratory 
subjects (see Appendices 1 and 2). Half of the booklets 
contained four statements. The remaining half contained 
eight statements. 
The description for the impression task was adapted 
from that used by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977). It 
contained sentences having an approximately equal probability 
of being interpreted as positive or as negative. For ex­
ample, the sentence "Donald was well aware of his ability 
to do many things well" could be construed as either self-
confident or as conceited. (See Appendix 3.) 
Procedure 
The experimenter entered the classroom, and was 
introduced by the instructor as a graduate student in need 
of subjects for a research project. The experimenter ex­
plained that the experiment involved a series of tasks that 
were to be explained as they were to be done. The experi­
menter then distributed the stimulus materials to those 
students who had agreed to participate. He instructed 
these subjects to keep the stimulus materials face-down on 
their desks until instructed to do otherwise. 
When all of the stimulus materials had been distributed, 
the experimenter returned to the front of the room, and 
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described the initial task. Subjects were told that this 
task was a measure of how well they could discern the 
emotions of another person. (See Appendix 4 for the precise 
instructions.) Subjects were told that the small booklet 
on their desk contained a series of statements that reflected 
a certain mood. Their task was to read each of the state­
ments, and then write a sentence that reflected the same 
mood as each printed statement. Half of the subjects had 
positive statements to reflect, whereas half had negative 
statements to reflect. Further, half of the subjects in 
each of these groups received a booklet of four statements 
to reflect, and half received a booklet of eight statements 
to reflect. Subjects were informed that different forms of 
the test were handed-out, and that they should therefore 
refrain from making comments aloud and from glancing at 
other subjects' booklets. 
Subjects were given 60 seconds to read the first 
statement and to think of a sentence that reflected the 
mood of the statement. At the end of this time, subjects 
were given another 60 seconds to write the sentence 
they had thought of. When this minute had elapsed, subjects 
were instructed to turn to the second statement, and think 
of a sentence that reflected the mood of this statement. 
They were again given 60 seconds to do this. At the end 
of this time, they were asked to write the sentence down, 
and so on. After all subjects had completed their fourth 
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statement, the experimenter informed them that they were to 
put their booklets aside, and go on to the second task. He 
mentioned that those subjects with the "short form of the 
test" (i.e., four statements) were done, whereas those with 
the "long form" (i.e., eight statements) were half-done with 
the initial task. No explicit information was given to 
indicate whether the subjects in the incompleted condition 
would or would not be asked to complete the initial task. 
For the second task, subjects were told that they were 
to read a story, and then answer some questions on the 
story. The story is printed in Appendix 3. Subjects were 
given three minutes to read the story. At the end of this 
time, they were asked to turn to the next sheet, and answer 
the questions on it. Subjects were not allowed to turn 
back to the "story when answering these questions. When all 
subjects had completed this task, the experimenter collected 
all of the materials, and then thoroughly de-briefed the 
participants. 
Dependent measures 
The measure of prime concern was the subject's responses 
to the questions about the stimulus person in the impression 
formation task. These responses were made by placing a mark 
on a six-point scale bounded by opposing trait adjectives. 
The adjectives bounding the first four scales were 
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adventurous--reckless, self-confident—conceited, indepen­
dent—aloof, and persistent--stubborn. These scales were 
answered in response to the statement "I think Donald can 
be characterized as:". 
Results 
The means for experiment one are listed in Table 1. 
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed to assess 
the effects of completion/incompletion and positive/negative 
prime on the four dependent measures. The analysis revealed 
a multivariate interaction that was significant according to 
each of the four tests of significance, i.e., Pillais, 
Hotellings, Wilks, and Roys (F = 5.62, df = 4.37, p < .001). 
This interaction indicates that there were significant dif­
ferences in the effects of the manipulations on the differ­
ent dependent measures. Some insight into the nature of 
these differences is provided by the univariate analyses on 
each of the dependent measures. 
There were highly significant interactions between 
the completion/incompletion manipulation and the positive/ 
negative prime manipulation for each of the dependent mea­
sures. Differences between the completed and the incompleted 
conditions within each priming condition were assessed by 
means of planned comparisons. 
For the adventurous-reckless measure, the interaction 
(F = 13.76, df = 1.40, p < .001) was due to the fact that 
the stimulus person was judged to be more adventurous in the 
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TABLE 1 
Means for the 4 rating scales used in Experiment 1 
Valence 
of primes 
positive negative 
complete 3.4 2.4 
incomplete 2.4 4.5 
positive negative 
complete 2.7 1.7 
incomplete l-8 3.3 
positive negative 
complete 2.0 1.5 
incomplete 1.6 3.9 
positive negative 
complete 3.1 1.8 
incomplete 1.8 4.5 
adventurous/ 
reckless 
self-confident/ 
conceited 
independent/ 
aloof 
persistent/ 
stubborn 
NOTE: The lov7er the nuraber, the more positive the impression. 
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incompleted-prime condition than in the eompleted-prime 
condition following the positive prime (p < -01), but was 
judged to be more adventurous in the completed-prime con­
dition than in the interrupted-prime condition following 
the negative prime (p < .005). For the independent-aloof 
measure, the interaction (F = 12.36, df « 1,40, p < .001) 
showed the same pattern of results as the other measures, 
but the differences between the impressions in the completed 
condition and the incompleted-condition following the posi­
tive prime were not significant (F < 1). The differences 
following the negative prime were significant, however 
(p < .001). 
For the persistent-stubborn measure the interaction 
(F = 17.87, df = 1,40, p < .001) was due to the fact that 
the stimulus person was rated as more persistent in the 
incompleted-condition than in the completed condition 
following the positive prime (p < .05), but was rated as 
more persistent in the completed-condition than in the in­
completed-condition following the negative prime (p < .001). 
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect 
for prime for the independent-aloof measure (F = 5.49, df = 
1,40, p < .024), and for the persistent-stubborn measure 
(F = 4.95, df « 1,40, p < .032), and a significant main 
effect for completion/incompletion for the independent-
aloof measure (F = 6.64, df = 1,40, p < .014). But, insofar 
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as main effects are difficult to interpret once significant 
interactions have been found, these main effects will receive 
no further discussion. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment One are supportive of the 
hypothesis that the completion/incompletion of an evaluative 
response can significantly influence the nature of impres­
sions formed subsequent to that response. The interpreta­
tion of an ambivalent stimulus was shifted toward the valence 
of the prime when the priming task was incomplete, but was 
shifted away from the valence of the prime when the priming 
task was completed. More generally, when the target was 
presented under conditions in which the initial evaluative 
response was likely to have perseverated (cf., Marrow, 1938; 
Zeigarnik, 1927), assimilation occurred. When the target 
was presented under conditions in which the initial evalua­
tive response was not likely to have perseverated, contrast 
occurred. These findings are consistent with the notion 
that positive context effects result from the integration of 
one evaluative response with another, whereas negative con­
text effects result from the differentiation of one response 
from another. 
This pattern of results seems to present some difficul­
ties to the prevailing conceptualizations of category 
accessibility (e.g., Herr et al., 1983; Higgins & King, 
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1981; Wyer & Srull, 1980). These conceptualizations have 
been based on the assumption that assimilation to an 
accessed category is a function of the applicability of the 
accessed categories, and how frequently and recently these 
categories have been primed. In short, assimilation is 
assumed to increase with the frequency and recency of cate­
gory activation, and to occur only when the target is within 
a certain range of similarity to the prime. When the target 
is beyond that range, contrast is assumed to occur. 
Although this conceptualization may be true, in so far 
as it goes, the results of Experiment One suggest that this 
conceptualization is incomplete. In Experiment One, the 
frequency, recency, and applicability of the primes were 
held constant, yet contrast as well as assimilation was 
observed. The only difference between the contrast and the 
assimilation conditions was the completion/incompletion of 
the priming task. Since the information presented to the 
subjects across the completed and incompleted-task condi­
tions was the same in all other respects, the differences 
in impressions obtained across these conditions would appear 
to be attributable only to the differential use of this in­
formation across the completed/incompleted conditions. 
One interpretation that is consistent with the present 
results would ascribe to the subjects different weighting 
strategies across the completed and incompleted conditions. 
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More specifically, in Experiment One, the prime was either 
positive or negative (i.e., univalent), whereas the target 
was both positive and negative (i.e., ambivalent). So, 
while the subjects could generate only univalent inferences 
about the prime, they could generate either positive or 
negative inferences about the target. When the priming 
task was interrupted, the impression of the target shifted 
toward the valence of the prime, suggesting that the sub­
jects weighted the features of the target that were similar 
to the prime. When the priming task was completed, the 
impression of the target shifted away from the valence of 
the prime, suggesting that the subjects weighted the features 
of the target that were distinct from the prime. 
Although this interpretation is more descriptive than 
explanatory at this point, it is potentially testable, and 
it does point to a number of interesting connections be­
tween the present work and work done in other areas. For 
one thing, it suggests an addition to the Herr et al. analy­
sis. As noted in the Introduction, Herr et al. suggested 
that assimilation and contrast to an accessed category were 
determined by the degree of similarity between the target 
and the prime. Insofar as the present experiment demon­
strated assimilation and contrast with the same prime and 
the same target, then any analysis which relies solely upon 
feature overlap cannot account for these data. 
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If perceived similarity, however, is conceptualized as 
a function of the number of common and distinctive features 
in the stimuli and the weight accorded to the features 
(e.g., Medin & Shaffer, 1978, Tversky, 1977), then a change 
in either number or weight could affect categorization. So, 
although Herr et al. stress the amount of feature overlap, 
and the present analysis stresses the perceiver's weighting 
strategies, both analyses suggest that similarity and cate­
gorization play a major role in determining impressions. 
Even though the results of Experiment One are consis­
tent with a differential weighting analysis, one might be 
tempted to hypothesize that the results were due, not to 
differences in weighting strategies, but to differences in 
the relative accessibility of the primed categories across 
the completed and the incompleted conditions. One might 
speculate that the prime was still accessible in the former 
condition but not in the latter. If so, then according to 
the prevailing conceptualizations of category accessibility, 
assimilation should have occurred in the incompleted condi­
tion but not in the completed condition. 
The weakness of this interpretation, though, is that 
it does not account for the contrast effects obtained in 
the completed-task conditions. If the completion of the 
priming task had made the prime unaccessible, or at least 
relatively unaccessible, then the prime should have had 
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little or no effect on the impressions in the conpleted-
task conditions. More specifically, the stimulus descrip­
tions should have been rated the same regardless of whether 
it followed a positive or a negative prime. That the im­
pressions in the completed-task condition were, in fact, 
shifted away from the valence of the primes indicates that 
the primes were still accessible, and that subjects used 
them as reference points from which to differentiate the 
target. 
In sum, Experiment One demonstrated that the persevera-
tion/completion of one evaluative response can significantly 
alter a subsequent evaluative response. It appears that 
when an initial evaluation perseverates, the second evalua­
tion is assimilated toward the first. When an initial 
evaluation is completed, the second evaluation is contrasted 
with the first. These results cannot be accounted for by 
the present conceptualizations of category accessibility, 
but are consistent with a differential weighting analysis. 
Experiment Two was designed to explore some of the implica­
tions of that analysis. 
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Chapter III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment One, it was demonstrated that the com­
pletion/ incomplet ion of an evaluative response can be an 
important determinant of context effects. Under conditions 
in which a primed response was likely to have perseverated, 
assimilation occurred. In situations where a primed re­
sponse was likely to have been terminated, contrast oc­
curred. It was suggested that these effects might be 
understood in terms of differences in the perceiver's 
weighting strategies. Although the results of Experiment 
One are consistent with this analysis, an alternate explana­
tion of the data exists. Specifically, the results of Ex­
periment One could be accounted for by a modified version 
of the Byrne and Clore (1970) reinforcement-affect model of 
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evaluation. 
According to the Byrne-Clore model, impression forma­
tion involves a process analogous to classical conditioning. 
The model is based on the assumption that people evaluate 
stimuli in terms of their affective state at the time of 
evaluation. If a person is in a positive affective state 
during an evaluation, positive feelings are conditioned to 
1̂ 0 
the target, and the target is evaluated as positive. If a 
person is in a negative affective state during an evaluation, 
negative feelings are conditioned to the target, and the 
target receives a negative evaluation. This relationship 
should hold regardless of whether the target stimulus was or 
was not the cause of the affective state. 
So, in Experiment One, subjects reading the positive 
statements should have been in a more positive affective 
state than subjects reading the negative statements. There­
fore, their evaluations should have been more positive than 
those given by subjects reading negative statements. The 
results in the interrupted-prime condition were consistent 
with this interpretation. The reverse pattern of results, 
however, was found in the completed-prime condition. This 
finding is inconsistent with the Byrne-Clore formulation. 
The full pattern of results may be explicable in terms 
of conditioned affect, however, if one considers that oppo­
nent processes (Schull, 1979; Solomon & Corbit, 1974) may 
be operative in the experimental setting. According to 
Solomon and Corbit's (1974) opponent process theory of 
motivation, every affective reaction is accompanied by a 
hedonically opposite reaction, such that an organism's 
affective response at any given moment reflects the inter­
action of these two opposing states. The A-state, or pri­
mary reaction, is assumed to be aroused immediately upon 
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stimulus presentation and to die away as soon as the stimulus 
is terminated. The B-state, or slave state, is assumed to 
take longer to recruit and longer to die away. The B-state 
reduces the intensity of the primary reaction, and eventually 
overpowers it. 
Applied to the circumstances involved in Experiment 
One, it might be assumed that the priming task induced in 
subjects both the A-state and the B-state. The A-state 
should dominate the subject's reactions while the initiating 
stimulus (i.e., the prime) is still active. The B-state 
should dominate when the initiating stimulus is no longer 
active. So, if prime incompletion and prime completion 
correspond to A-state perseveration and termination, re­
spectively, then a conditioned opponent process view would 
predict a positive relationship between the valence of the 
prime and the valence of the impression in the interrupted-
prime condition, but a negative relationship between the 
valence of the prime and the valence of the impression in 
the completed-prime condition. Thus, a conditioned opponent 
process view and a differential weighting view make the same 
predictions under the conditions of Experiment One. 
There are at least two conditions, however, in which 
these viewpoints make different predictions regarding im­
pressions. One occurs when a person is asked to make 
inferences in terms of features that are evaluatively, but 
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not descriptively, related to the prime. The other occurs 
when the priming task involves both a positive and a 
negative valence. 
Although the opponent process theorists have not con­
cerned themselves with inferences processes (or impression 
formation), it seems reasonable to assume that from a con­
ditioned affect perspective inferences would be expected to 
follow an evaluative rule (cf., Byrne & Clore, 1970). In 
other words, it seems reasonable to assume that a person in 
a positive mood would tend to attribute positive characteris­
tics to an object. A person in a negative state would tend 
to attribute negative characteristics to an object. This 
assumption is reasonable since the opponent process view, 
as currently formulated, speaks only of an A-state and its 
hedonic opposite. No finer gradations of meaning or emotion 
are made. 
The differential weighting analysis, on the other 
hand, assumes that judgmental shifts result from changes in 
the weight accorded to the common and distinctive features 
of the stimuli (cf., Tversky, 1977). So, while inferences 
may often follow an evaluative rule, they may not always do 
so (Felipe, 1970; Peabody, 1968; 1970). More specifically, 
when a stimulus' descriptive content (i.e., its dictionary 
meaning) is more diagnostic (Tversky, 1977) than its evalu­
ative content (i.e., its positivity/negativity), then shifts 
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in judgment could occur only on those features of the target 
that are descriptively related to the prime. 
If the priming task involves both a positive and a 
negative valence, and if neither valence predominates, 
then a conditioned-opponent process view would predict no 
difference between impressions formed after a completed 
prime and those formed after an incompleted prime. This 
should be the case because there is no dominant A-state, 
and hence no dominant B-state in the situation. If, on the 
other hand, one of the valences in a mixed-valence prime 
were to predominate, then impressions follovying the com-
pletion/incompletion of the prime would be expected to show 
the kind of overall positive-negative shifts observed in 
Experiment One. That is, the impression should shift from 
the valence of the dominant A-state to that of the dominant 
B-state. 
From a differential weighting analysis, it is not tin-
reasonable to expect that both valences of a mixed-valence 
prime could be diagnostic, and that shifts could occur in 
terms of both. When this occurs, a differential weighting 
analysis would predict that impressions following the com-
pletion/incompletion of a prime would not show the kind of 
overall positive-negative shifts observed in Experiment 
One, but would instead show selective shifts in terms of 
those features of the target that are descriptively related 
to the prime. 
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Experiment Two was designed to test these opposing 
predictions. Subjects were presented with either a mixed-
valence (i.e., bold, egotistical) or a negative (e.g., 
reckless, egotistical) priming task, and either were or 
were not allowed to complete this task. Subjects were 
then asked to rate a stimulus person in terms of features 
that either were or were not descriptively related to the 
prime (e.g., conceited versus dishonest, respectively). 
Under these conditions, the conditioned opponent pro­
cess view as extended to impression formation, would pre­
dict that impressions following the completion/incompletion 
of a prime would show an overall A-state to B-state shift 
on both descriptive and evaluative measures, at least fol­
lowing the univalent prime. No effect may occur at all for 
the completion/incompletion manipulation if the opposing 
states in the ambivalent prime cancel one another out. The 
differential weighting analysis would predict that those 
measures that are descriptively related to the prime would 
shift toward the prime when the priming task is inbompleted, 
but would shift away from the prime when the priming task 
is completed. Measures descriptively unrelated to the prime 
should not be affected by the complete/incomplete manipula­
tion. 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty females from introductory psychology classes at 
the University of North Carolina at Greensboro served as 
subjects. All subjects received course credit for their 
participation. There were ten subjects in each of the 
experimental conditions. 
Design 
A connotatively mixed priming task and a connotatively 
negative priming task were crossed with the completion and 
the incompletion of the priming task to yield four between-
group conditions: mixed-complete, mixed-incomplete, nega­
tive- complete, and negative-incomplete. 
Stimulus Materials 
Subjects were presented with a seven-page stack of 
papers. This stack of papers contained four pencil-and-
paper tests adapted from those used by Marrow (1938), along 
with a priming task and an impression formation task. The 
stimuli for the priming task and the impression formation 
task were imbedded in this stack of papers. The priming 
stimuli were lists of phrases that connotated either bold­
ness and egotisticalness (i.e., mixed condition) or fool-
hardiness and egotisticalness (i.e., negative condition). 
As an example, the phrase "volunteered for espionage duty 
while in the army" connotates boldness. The phrase "smokes 
cigarettes while working near an open can of gasoline" 
connotates foolhardiness. (A complete listing of the 
priming phrases are contained in Appendices 5 through 8.) 
The description for the impression formation task was the 
same as that used in Experiment One. The pencil-and-paper 
tasks will be described in the next section of the paper. 
Procedure 
Subjects were brought into the experimental room one 
at a time, and asked to sit in a desk. The experimenter 
then placed the stack of papers face down on the subject's 
desk. Subjects were then asked to write their name on the 
back of the top sheet, and to leave the papers face down 
until instructed to do otherwise. The experimenter then 
took a seat at another desk across from the subject, and 
proceeded to play the tape-recorded instructions. It was 
explained that the instructions were recorded to insure that 
everyone in the experiment received exactly the same instruc­
tions. The instructions were adapted from those used by 
Marrow (1938) in his investigations of the Zeigarnik effect. 
The instructions for the present experiment were as follows: 
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I am going to give you a series of pencil-
and paper tests. These tests will be given 
to you one at a time. At the signal "Begin" 
start working as rapidly and as accurately as 
you can. Both of these factors are of equal 
importance in your final score. The instruc­
tions for each test are printed at the top of 
each test sheet. I would like you to read the 
instructions, and ask any questions you may 
have about them before you begin working. There 
are definite things called for in every test. 
Be sure to notice exactly what these are, and 
then try to accomplish them as quickly and as 
correctly as you can. Also, there is a specific 
amount of time allotted for each part of the 
test. When this time period is up, you will be 
asked to stop what you are doing, and move im­
mediately to the next part of the test, even if 
you have not completed the part you are working 
on. Keep in mind that failure to complete any 
one part of the test does not necessarily mean 
a low score on the test as a whole. We are in­
terested in your overall performance. You 
should, however, try your best to complete every 
part of the test. 
This is the first time that this test has 
been given to UNC-G students. It has been used 
to a limited extent at another university in the 
area, where this test originated. It is our 
purpose in repeating this test to find an answer 
to two major problems. First, is this test uni­
versal in its general applicability? Second, 
is the average score obtained by our students 
higher, equal to, or lower than that obtained 
by the students from the other university? Our 
results thus far, while not complete, show a 
definite superiority of our students' scores. 
This is very encouraging, and I am hoping for 
even higher scores from the remaining students. 
The results of this experiment will be published 
next year, and I am most anxious to report a 
UNC-G level of achievement that will exceed that 
of the students from the other university. I 
hope you will give me your best efforts. 
At the conclusion of these taped instructions, the ex­
perimenter answered any questions the subject may have had, 
and then continued, orally, with the following instructions: 
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When you begin, I would like you to start with 
the top sheet. When X tell you, I would like 
you to turn it face-up. When you do so, you 
will see the instructions for the task printed 
across the top of the test sheet. I would like 
you to read through these instructions, and see 
if you have any questions about them before you 
begin working on the task. If you have any 
questions, bring them up, and we will try to 
clear them out of the way before you actually 
begin working. If you don't have any questions, 
tell me "OK". Then, I'll know you are ready 
to begin, and I can start the time. There is 
a specific amount of time for each of the tasks. 
If you should finish the task before I've called 
time-up, let me know that you are done, and I'll 
record the time. Then, we can move on to the 
next task. If, however, the time period ex­
pires before you have completed the task you 
are working on, I'll simply say "Time's up. 
Would you please move on to the next task?" 
Then, just move on to the next task. You should 
try your best, however, to complete each of the 
tasks in the amount of time you'll be given. 
Any questions? 
After the subject indicated that she was ready to begin, 
the experimenter instructed her to turn over the first sheet, 
and begin the first task. The first task involved the un­
scrambling of the names of seven fruits and vegetables (e.g., 
neargo, plepa, prages). When the subjects completed this 
task, the experimenter recorded the amount of time the sub­
ject took to complete the task. When this was done, the 
subject was instructed to proceed to the next task. The 
second task consisted of locating and circling eight letter 
T's that were randomly distributed in a block of one hundred 
and forty-three letters. When subjects had finished this 
task, the experimenter recorded the subject's time, and 
said, "So far, so good. Would you go on to the next task?" 
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The third task was the priming task. Subjects were 
asked to divide a series of phrases into two categories. 
Half of the subjects were presented with phrases that were 
related to either boldness or to egotisticalness (i.e., 
mixed valence prime). The other half were presented with 
phrases that were related to either foolhardiness or ego­
tisticalness (i.e., negative prime). Subjects were asked 
to place the number of the phrase under the column that they 
felt the phrase belonged in. Half of the subjects in each 
of these conditions were presented with eight phrases to 
categorize. Half were presented with twelve phrase to cate­
gorize. Subjects in the eight-phrase condition were allowed 
to categorize all eight phrases, and then move on to the 
next task. Subjects in the twelve-phrase condition were 
interrupted after they had categorized the first eight 
phrases, and were then asked to move on to the next task. 
Thus, all subjects were exposed to the same primes (within 
mixed and negative conditions), but for half of the sub­
jects the priming task was complete, and for half it was 
incomplete. 
In the fourth task, subjects were asked to count 
backwards from thirty to two, alternately skipping three 
and four numbers (e.g., 30, 27, 23, 20). At the conclusion 
of this task, the experimenter announced, "You are still 
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doing well. Go on to the next task." The fifth task in­
volved the generation of five words from a set of seven 
letters printed on the sheet. 
The sixth task was the impression formation task. 
Subjects were informed that they had as much as a minute 
and a half to read the story. The story was the same as 
that used in Experiment One. Subjects were told that once 
they were finished reading over the story they were to turn 
it face-down, and go on to the next task which involved 
answering questions about the story. After subjects had 
read the story, and had turned to the rating scales, the 
experimenter announced that the rating scale task was not 
being timed, and that they could proceed at their own pace. 
At the conclusion of this task, subjects were asked to 
write down as much as they could remember of the description 
of the stimulus person. They were given two minutes to do 
this. When subjects had completed this last task, they were 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Dependent measures 
The measure of prime concern was the subject's re­
sponses to the questions about the stimulus person in the 
impression formation task. These responses were made by 
placing a mark along a seven-point scale bounded by opposing 
trait adjectives. The adjectives bounding each of the four 
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scales were as follows: adventurous--reckless, self-
confident—conceited, polite—crude, and honest—dishonest. 
The serial order of these scales was counterbalanced across 
subjects. The scales were answered in response to the 
statement "I think Donald can be characterized as:". 
Results 
The means for Experiment Two are listed in Table 2. 
Because one of the major manipulations in the study in­
volved the completion/incompletion of the priming task, an 
a priori decision had to be made to exclude from considera­
tion the data of any subject who was either unable to com­
plete any of the distractor tasks, or who had a great deal 
of difficulty on any of the tasks (e.g., took more than 
three minutes to complete a task that the majority of sub­
jects completed in less than a minute). Also, no data were 
accepted from subjects who miscategorized two or more of the 
priming statements. 
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed to 
assess the effects of completion/incompletion and mixed/ 
negative prime on the four dependent measures. This analy­
sis revealed a multivariate interaction that was significant 
according to each of the four tests of significance, i.e. , 
Pillais, Hotellings, Wilks, and Roys (F = 5.62, df « 4,42, 
p < .001). This interaction indicates that there were sig­
nificant differences in the effects of the manipulations on 
the different dependent measures. Some insight into the 
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TABLE 2 
Means for the 4 rating scales used in Experiment 2 
Valence 
of primes 
mixed negative 
complete 4.0 2.5 
incomplete 2.1 4.2 
mixed negative 
complete 2.4 2.6 
incomplete 2.0 3.5 
mixed negative 
complete 2.7 2.9 
incomplete 2.7 3.2 
mixed negative 
complete 4.1 3.2 
incomplete 3.9 4.4 
adventurous/ 
reckless 
self-confident/ 
conceited 
honest/ 
dishonest 
polite/ 
crude 
NOTE: The lower the number, the more positive the impression. 
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nature of these differences is obtained by looking at the 
results of the univariate analyses on each of the dependent 
measures. Specific differences within each priming condition 
were assessed by planned comparisons. 
There was a highly significant interaction between the 
completion/incompletion manipulation and the mixed/negative 
primes for the adventurous-reckless measure (F = 21.12, 
df = 1,36, p < .001). This interaction was due to the fact 
that the stimulus person in the mixed-prime condition (i.e., 
bold, egotistical) was rated as more adventurous when the 
priming task had been interrupted than when it had been 
completed (p < .005). The stimulus person in the negative 
prime condition (i.e., foolhardy, egotistical) was rated as 
more adventurous when the prime had been completed than when 
it had been interrupted (p < .005). 
For the self-confident—conceited measure, the mar­
ginally significant interaction (F = 2.83, df = 1,36, p < 
.10), and the significant main effect for prime (F = 4.75, 
df ® 1,36, p < .036) appear to have resulted from the fact 
that the stimulus person was rated as more conceited in the 
incomplete-negative condition than in any of the other con­
ditions. Also, there was little difference between the 
ratings of the stimulus person in the other three conditions. 
None of the planned comparisons was significant. 
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For the polite-crude measure, there was a significant 
prime-by-interruption interaction (F «= 21.12, df « 1,36, 
p < .001), and a marginally significant main effect for 
completion (F » 3.29, df = 1,36, p < .08). For this measure, 
there was no difference between the ratings of the stimulus 
person across the complete/incomplete manipulation in the 
mixed-prime condition. The stimulus person in the negative-
prime condition was rated as significantly nore polite in 
the completed-condition than in the incompleted-condition 
(P < -01). 
Finally, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions for the honest-dishonest measure. The stimulus 
person was rated as having the same degree of honesty re­
gardless of the condition under which the person was 
evaluated. 
Discussion 
In Experiment Two, the pattern of judgmental shifts 
following the completion/incompletion of a mixed prime 
(i.e., bold, egotistical) was different from that follow­
ing a negative prime (i.e., foolhardy, egotistical). In 
the mixed prime condition, the stimulus person was rated as 
more adventurous following the incompleted-prime than fol­
lowing the completed-prime, but was not rated as differing 
in self-confidence, honesty, or politeness across the 
complete/incomplete conditions. In the negative prime con­
dition, on the other hand, the stimulus person was rated as 
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reckless, conceited, and crude in the incompleted condition, 
but was rated as adventurous, self-confident, and polite in 
the completed condition. 
The results in the mixed-prime condition are clearly 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that inferences followed 
an evaluative rule. Had inferences followed such a rule, 
the stimulus person rated as adventurous would also have 
been ascribed the other positive traits, whereas the stimulus 
person rated as reckless would also have been ascribed the 
other negative traits. Although the obtained results are 
consistent with a descriptive-shift interpretation, they 
do indicate that a perceiver presented with a mixed-valence 
prime may not use both valences in making judgments. When 
exposed to two inconsistent primes, the subjects seemed to 
base their impressions on one prime, and discount the other. 
This discounting cannot be attributed to the specific prime 
used, since the one that was discounted (i.e., egotistical) 
was identical in every way to the one that yielded a mar­
ginally significant effect in the negative-prime condition. 
It appears that when more than one category is primed, the 
relationship between the two is important in determining 
the nature of judgments made subsequent to the prime. 
In the negative-prime condition, three out of four mea­
sures showed significant differences across complete/incom­
plete conditions. The stimulus person was rated as more 
reckless, conceited, and crude following the incompleted-
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prime than following the completed-prime. It is important 
to note that a significant difference was obtained for the 
polite-crude measure across the completion/incompletion 
conditions following the negative prime. Since no effect 
was obtained for this measure in the mixed prime condition, 
it appears that subjects in the negative prime condition 
based their inferences on an evaluative rule. According to 
this rule, a stimulus person with one (or more) positive 
traits would be attributed other positive traits, whereas 
a stimulus person with one (or more) negative traits would 
be attributed other negative traits. 
Although the difference between the degree of honesty 
accorded the stimulus person did not differ following the 
completion/incompletion of the negative prime, the differ­
ences were in the direction predicted by an evaluative in­
ference process. Admittedly, this shift is weak. The lack 
of effect on the honest-dishonest measure in the negative 
prime condition may have been due to the fact that the 
traits honest and dishonest have a greater hedonic value 
than any of the other traits used as dependent measures 
(Anderson, 1968). It may be that an increase in the inten­
sity of the prime would have resulted in a shift on the 
honest-dishonest measure similar to that found for the other 
measures. More generally, the hedonic value of a prime may 
have to be more extreme in order to change a moralistic 
judgment, like honesty, than to change a social desireabil-
ity judgment, like politeness. 
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In sum, the results of Experiment Two support the notion 
that different features of a stimulus are differentially 
sensitive to judgmental shifts following incompleted and 
completed tasks. 
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Chapter IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, the results of Experiments One and 
Two support the notion that the perseveration/termination 
of one evaluative response can have a significant effect 
upon another, and that this effect can occur regardless of 
whether the perseverated/terminated response is a broad 
affective response (Experiment One) or a more specific de­
scriptive one (Experiment Two). In both studies, impres­
sions of a target stimulus were shifted toward the prime 
under conditions in which the primed response is likely to 
have perseverated, whereas impressions of a target stimulus 
shifted away from the prime under conditions in which the 
primed response is likely to have been terminated. 
This pattern of results leads us to conclude with Herr 
et al. (1983) that category priming is not a simple opera­
tion with single effects. Rather, it appears that a per-
ceiver's weighting strategies can affect his or her use of an 
accessed category. The results of Experiments One and Two 
are consistent with the notion that when the primed response 
is perseverated (as when stimuli are evaluated as a unit), 
then the perceiver searches for features in the incoming 
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stimuli that allow him or her to categorize this information 
with the initially accessed information, whereas when the 
primed response is terminated (as in the evaluation of 
distinct stimuli), the perceiver searches for features in 
the incoming information that allow him or her to categorize 
this information separately from the initially received 
information. Then, to the extent that the searched-for 
features are found, assimilation should occur when the 
priming response is perseverated, whereas contrast should 
occur when the priming response is completed. 
Theories of assimilation and contrast 
Although the present analysis has assumed that response 
perseveration/termination affects a perceiver's use of in­
formation, other formulations have been forwarded to account 
for assimilation and contrast effects. Some investigators 
have suggested, for example, that shifts in reported judg­
ments result, not from changed attitudes or perceptions, 
but from changes in the anchoring of the response scale. 
According to these formulations (e.g., Parducci, 1976; 
Upshaw, 1979), individuals use what they perceive to be the 
extremes of the stimulus range to define the endpoints of 
a psychological response scale. Intermediate stimuli are 
subsequently judged in terms of their relationship to these 
endpoints. If the endpoints change, then the relationship 
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between the individual's perceptions and reported judgments 
may change. Hence, the individual's judgments may shift. 
So, for example, if a person were asked to judge a series 
of weights ranging from 1 gram to 10 grams, and a series 
of weights ranging from 10 grams to 20 grams, the 10 
gram stimulus would be termed heavy in the former condition 
and light in the latter condition, even if the person per­
ceived the weight of the stimulus to be the same in both 
series of weights. 
It is unclear, however, how this kind of analysis 
might account for the present pair of experiments. In both 
experiments, all subjects received the same primes, the 
same target stimuli, and the same response scales across 
the complete/incomplete conditions. Therefore, all subjects 
should have had the same range and the same endpoints across 
these conditions. If so, then there should have been no 
shifts in response language, and, hence, no shifts in 
judgment as a result of the completion/incompletion of the 
priming task. The significant prime-by-completion/incom-
pletion interactions obtained in both studies suggest that 
response scale theories, as they are currently formulated, 
do not account for the shifts in judgment observed in the 
present pair of studies. 
Problems in interpreting these data are not limited to 
response scale theories, however. Perceptual theories that 
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rely upon the psychological distance between stimuli to 
account for shifts in judgment (e.g., Helson, 1964) also 
have difficulty in accounting for the present results. 
These theories hold, in brief, that the closer a stimulus 
is to another along the dimension of judgment, the more 
likely it is that assimilation will occur. When the distance 
between two stimuli is beyond some critical range, contrast 
occurs. As mentioned earlier, though, the same stimuli were 
used across the complete/incomplete conditions. So, the 
psychological distance should have been the same across 
these conditions, according to the present formulations of 
distance models (i.e., Helson, 1964). As a result, there 
should have been no differences between the impressions 
across the complete and the incomplete conditions. 
Although the present results seem to be inconsistent 
with specific formulations of the distance model, the results 
are not necessarily inconsistent with the broader conceptual­
izations of such models. It may be the case, for example, 
that a perceiver's weighting strategies alter the psycho­
logical distance between a stimulus and a prime. More 
specifically, it may be the case that when the common fea­
tures are weighted, the stimulus and the prime are psycho­
logically close, whereas when the distinct features are 
weighted, the stimulus and the prime are psychologically 
distant. To make this integration, though, the existing 
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models would have to incorporate all of the basic assump­
tions of this paper, as well as significantly alter a few 
of their current assumptions. 
Set, re-set, comparison 
Perhaps the most parsimonious account of the present 
data is in terms of what can be called the set, re-set, 
comparison analysis. The basic assumptions of the analysis 
are as follows: 
1. Social judgment is a categorization process in­
volving a comparison of the features of the input with those 
of the perceiver's knowledge base. 
2. Social stimuli are rnultifeatured, and the context 
in which a stimulus is embedded determines which subset of 
its features is most weighted. 
3. The subset of a stimulus' features that are most 
weighted on any given occasion determines the categorization 
of the stimulus. 
4. Once a stimulus has been categorized in terms of 
certain features, other features associated with the cate­
gory, but not apparent in the stimulus, may be attributed to 
the stimulus. 
5. When a number of stimuli are evaluated as a unit, 
the perceiver searches for features in the incoming informa­
tion that allow him or her to categorize this information with 
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the initially received information. Then, to the extent 
that the searched-for features are found, assimilation 
should occur, whereas to the extent that the searched-for 
features are not found, contrast should occur. 
6. When a number of stimuli are evaluated as distinct 
from one another, the perceiver searches for features in 
the incoming stimuli that allow him or her to categorize this 
information differently from the initially received informa­
tion. Then, to the extent that the searched-for features 
are found, contrast should occur, whereas to the extent 
that the searched-for features are not found, assimilation 
should occur. 
This view suggests that impression formation involves 
an interaction between a perceiver's knowledge base and the 
context-induced weighting of features. When different 
features of a stimulus are weighted, the stimulus may get 
mapped onto different aspects of the knowledge base. Fur­
ther, these differences in mapping may most often represent 
changes in a stimulus' intensions rather than its extensions. 
Intensions and extensions 
Intension refers to the meaning or implications of a 
term, whereas extension refers to the object in the real 
world that is singled out by the term. The classic example 
of this distinction involves what astronomers had referred 
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to as the "morning star" and the "evening star". The term 
morning star was used to refer to the object that was to be 
seen above the horizon only in the morning hours, whereas 
the term evening star was used to refer to that object that 
was to be seen above the horizon only in the evening hours. 
Subsequent observation indicated that the same object was 
being referred to in each case, namely, the planet Venus. 
So, although the terms morning star and evening star had 
different implications, they referred to the same concrete 
object. That is, the terms had different intensions, but 
the same extensions. 
Applied to the present pair of studies, this distinc­
tion would correspond to a case in which two subjects read, 
for example, that the stimulus person drove in a demolition 
derby, and one interprets this action as adventurous and the 
other interprets the action as reckless. For both subjects, 
the action "driving in a demolition derby" may refer to the 
same real-world event, but the action differs in the impli­
cations it carries for the two subjects. That is, the action 
has the same extension, but different intensions. 
If intensions can be thought of as a set of features 
associated with a stimulus, then it follows that the context 
within which a stimulus is embedded could alter the weight 
assigned to the various intensions. This, in turn, could 
alter further categorization of the stimulus. 
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A number of studies in sentence comprehension and person 
perception have obtained results which support this analy­
sis. Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrel, and Nitsch 
(1974) hypothesized that the sentential context within which 
a word is embedded determines which of its many meanings 
would be encoded. The term "piano", for instance, variously 
refers to a heavy piece of furniture or a musical instrument. 
In a sentence like "The man lifted the piano", the implica­
tion that the piano is heavy is emphasized, while the impli­
cation that it is a musical instrument is less important. 
Conversely, in the sentence "The man tuned the piano", the 
implication that a piano makes nice sounds is important, 
whereas the piano's weight is not. So, if the sentence con­
text within which the term is embedded alters the encoding 
of that term", then the phrase "something heavy" should serve 
as an effective recall cue for the term piano in the former 
sentence but not in the latter sentence, whereas the phrase 
"something that makes nice sounds" would be an effective 
retrieval cue in the latter condition but not in the former. 
Barclay et al. presented the results of several studies that 
supported this hypothesis. 
Similar results were obtained by Woll, Weeks, Fraps, 
Pendergras, & Vanderplas (1980) in the impression formation 
paradigm. These investigators found that subjects who read 
the sentence pair "Sam is influential. When he presents his 
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ideas, even his supervisors pay attention" were much more 
likely to view Sam as an authority than were subjects who 
read either the sentence pair "Sam is influential. He has 
friends who are willing to do him favors" or the sentence 
pair "Sam is entertaining. When he presents his ideas, even 
his supervisors pay attention." These results are consis­
tent with the notion that impressions of a stimulus person 
are determined by the context-induced interpretations of 
stimuli associated with the person. These results also are 
compatible with those found in the present experiments. One 
difference is that Woll et al. manipulated the semantic con­
text, whereas the present two studies manipulated the non-
semantic context. In both cases, though, semantic effects 
were observed. 
Confirming and disconfirming features 
Numerous studies have supported the notion that a per­
son' s initial beliefs about an object or event guides the 
strategies that a person uses to test these beliefs. This 
work has demonstrated that people tend to seek information 
that confirms, rather than disconfirms, their initial be­
liefs (e.g., Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Snyder & 
Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Swann, 1978). 
Snyder and Cantor (1979) had individuals read of events 
in the life of a stimulus person. The story contained equal 
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amounts of introverted and extraverted characteristics. 
Two days after reading the story, subjects were asked to 
determine the degree to which the stimulus person was suited 
for a job that required the characteristics of either an 
introvert or an extravert. Before reporting their judgments, 
subjects were asked to report all of the previously learned 
facts that they regarded as relevant to their decision. 
Subjects judging the person's suitability for the extra­
vert job reported more extravert than introvert characteris­
tics as relevant to their decision, whereas subjects judging 
the person's suitability for the introvert job reported more 
introvert than extravert characteristics as relevant to their 
decision. In other words, the subjects appeared to give 
little consideration to those features of the target that 
could disconfirm the hypothesis that the person would be 
suited for the job. 
The tendency to weight confirmatory evidence more 
heavily than disconfirmatory evidence appeared to be so 
dominant that Snyder and White (1981) conducted a study to 
see if individuals were "unable" to solicit hypothesis-
disconfirming evidence or simply "unwilling" to do so. Sub­
jects were asked to determine the extent to which a stimulus 
person either "was" or "was not" of a specific personality 
type. When subjects were asked to verify a hypothesis (i.e., 
the person i£ an extravert), they sought evidence confirming 
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their initial impression. When subjects were asked to 
falsify a hypothesis (i.e., the person is not an extravert), 
they sought evidence that could disconfirm their initial 
impression. 
Snyder and White concluded that the reluctance of 
individuals to seek disconfirming information results, not 
from an inability to use such information, but from the 
tendency to define hypothesis-testing tasks as one of pref­
erentially building a case in support of the hypothesis. 
This conclusion is consistent with the suggestion that 
individuals encode events and situations as "instances of" 
a category, rather than as "non-instances" of a category 
(Rothbart et al., 1979; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
Since the initial flurry of studies indicating that 
individuals seek confirming evidence, a number of other 
studies have been published which indicated that individuals 
search for disconfirming information (e.g., Fiske, Kinder, 
& Larter, 1983; Lingle, Dukerich, & Ostrom, 1983). Although 
the conditions that determine an individual's hypothesis-
testing strategies are not yet fully understood (Lingle et 
al., 1983), the set, re-set, comparison analysis points to 
some factors that may influence these strategies. If a 
primed category can be thought of as an initial hypothesis, 
then in the present pair of experiments, individuals appeared 
to seek confirming evidence in the incompleted conditions, 
but to seek disconfinning evidence in the completed 
conditions. Put another way, subjects in the incompleted-
prime condition encoded the target as an "instance of" the 
initially accessed category, whereas subjects in the com-
pleted-prime condition encoded the target person as a "non-
instance" of the initially accessed category. Thus, the 
termination of one task and the beginning of another may 
signal a search for features in the environment that dis­
tinguish one task from another. 
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Appendix 1 
PRIMING STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
POSITIVE CONDITION 
I have very little to worry about. 
Most mornings I wake up refershed and energetic. 
When I'm feeling this good, even the least little things 
in life are a great pleasure. 
God, it's great to be alive!-
Appendix 2 
PRIMING STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
NEGATIVE CONDITION 
I often worry about things a lot. 
Most mornings I just can't seem to get started. 
When I'm feeling this bad, even the least little things 
in life are a great effort. 
God, what a pain it is to be alive. 
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Appendix 3 
STIMULUS DESCRIPTION FOR IMPRESSION FORMATION TASK 
FOR EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
Donald spent a great amount of his tine in search of 
what he liked to call excitement. He had already climbed 
Mt. McKinley, shot the Colorado rapids in a kyack, driven in 
a demolition derby, and piloted a jet powered boat--without 
knowing very much about boats. He had risked injury, and 
even death a number of times. Now he was in search of new 
excitement. He was thinking, perhaps, he would do some sky­
diving or maybe cross the Atlantic in a sailboat. By the 
way he acted one could readily guess that Donald was well 
aware of his ability to do many things well. Other than 
business engagements, Donald's contacts with other people 
were rather limited. He felt he didn't need to rely on 
anyone. Once Donald made up his mind to do something it was 
as good as done no matter how long it might take or how dif­
ficult the going might be. Only rarely did he change his 
mind even when it might well have been better if he had. 
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Appendix 4 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
You will be given part of a social empathy inventory. 
The purpose of the inventory is to see how well you can 
match your feelings with those of another person. On your 
desk, you will see a small booklet. On each sheet of the 
booklet is a statement that a person in a certain mood might 
make. Your task will be to read each of these statements, 
and then decide what mood is being expressed in each. Once 
you have decided, you are to write a sentence that expresses 
the same mood as the statement. We don't want you to just 
re-word the printed statement. What we want you to do, in­
stead, is to capture, in your own words, the mood of each 
statement. You will be given one minute to read the first 
statement, and to think of a sentence that reflects the 
same mood as the printed statement. At the end of this time 
you will be given one minute to write the sentence down. 
When this second minute is up, you will be asked to turn to 
the next statement, and think of a sentence that reflects 
the mood of that statement, and so on. I will tell you when 
to move from one statement to the next. High social empathy 
scores have been associated with leadership skills, and with 
one's ability to get along well with others. Keep in mind 
that there are no right or wrong answers in the absolute 
sense. What we are looking for is how well you can match 
your feelings with those of the printed statements. 
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Appendix 5 
PRIMING TASK FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
MIXED/INCOMPLETE CONDITION 
Read each of the phrases below, and decide whether it refers 
to someone who is "bold" or who is "egotistical". If you 
feel that the phrase describes someone who is "bold", write 
the number of that phrase under the column marked "bold". 
If you feel that the phrase describes someone who is "ego­
tistical", write the number of that phrase under the column 
marked "egotistical". There are twelve phrases in all, and 
six belong in each column. 
BOLD EGOTISTICAL 
1. brags about how well he does things 
2. volunteered for espionage duty while in the army 
3. feels that no one but him can do things well 
4. considers himself superior to others 
5. entered an amateur rodeo just for the fun of it 
6. tries to make himself the center of attention 
7. was a photographer at the eruption of Mount St. Helens 
8. worked one simmer as a trapeze artist in the circus 
9. his favorite topic of conversation is himself 
10. likes trying new things 
11. climbed Mt. Everest 
12. never passes a mirror without looking at himself in it 
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Appendix 6 
PRIMING TASK FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
MIXED/COMPLETE CONDITION 
Read each of the phrases below, and decide whether it refers 
to someone who is "bold" or who is "egotistical". If you 
feel that the phrase describes someone who is "bold", write 
the number of that phrase under the column marked "bold". 
If you feel that the phrase describes someone who is "ego­
tistical", write the number of that phrase under the column 
marked "egotistical". There are eight phrases in all, and 
four belong in each column. 
BOLD EGOTISTICAL 
1. brags about how well he does things 
2. volunteered for espionage duty while in the army 
3. feels that no one but him can do things well 
4. considers himself superior to others 
5. entered an amateur rodeo just for the fun of it 
6. tries to make himself the center of attention 
7. was a photographer at the eruption of Mount St. Helens 
8. worked one summer as a trapeze artist in the circus 
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Appendix 7 
PRIMING TASK FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
NEGATIVE/INCOMPLETE CONDITION 
Read each of the phrases below, and decide whether it refers 
to a person who is "foolhardy" or who is "egotistical". If 
you feel that the sentence describes someone who is "foolhar­
dy", place the number of that sentence under the column marked 
"foolhardy". If you feel that the sentence describes some­
one who is "egotistical", place the number of that sentence 
under the column marked "egotistical". There are twelve sen­
tences in all, and six sentences belong in each column. 
FOOLHARDY EGOTISTICAL 
1. brags about how well he does things 
2. endangered the lives of others while driving under the 
influence of alcohol 
3. feels that no one but him can do things well 
4. considers himself superior to others 
5. smokes cigarettes while working near an open can of 
gasoline 
6. tries to make himself the center of attention 
7. shoots a rifle in his apartment for fun 
8. went hiking unprepared, and got lost in the woods for 
a week 
9. drove his car down a residential street at 70 miles per 
hour to impress his girlfriend 
10. his favorite topic of conversation is himself 
11. set off a small forest fire by leaving his campfire 
unattended 
12. never passes a mirror without looking at himself in it 
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Appendix 8 
PRIMING TASK FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
NEGATIVE/COMPLETE CONDITION 
Read each of the phrases below, and describe whether it re­
fers to a person who is "foolhardy" or who is "egotistical". 
If you feel that the sentence describes someone who is "fool­
hardy", place the number of that sentence under the column 
marked "foolhardy". If you feel that the sentence describes 
someone who is "egotistical", place the number of that sen­
tence under the column marked egotistical". There are eight 
sentences in all, and four sentences belong in each column. 
FOOLHARDY EGOTISTICAL 
1. brags about how well he does things 
2. endangered the lives of others while driving under the 
influence of alcohol 
3. feels that no one but him can do things well 
4. considers himself superior to others 
5. smokes cigarettes while working near an open can of 
gasoline 
6. tries to make himself the center of attention 
7. shoots a rifle in his apartment for fun 
8. went hiking unprepared, and got lost in the woods for 
a week 
